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IMPROVING CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY BY
STRENGTHENING EMPLOYMENT LAW
INTRODUCTION
n recent years, companies have been compared to teenag-
ers who, without special incentives to do their homework,
simply will not do it.1 For example, Delaware’s Chancellor
Strine,2 who has witnessed the evolution of corporate decision
making on a daily basis for the past forty years in the state
that is the legal home to more than half of all U.S.-listed com-
panies, draws this analogy in In re MFW Litigation.3 Procedur-
al protections such as programs to assess risks and to prevent,
detect, and respond to misconduct, when implemented correct-
ly, can deter excessive risk taking as well as fraud.4 Yet, Strine
says the fact that these protections are good for the company is
not in itself sufficient to prompt action.5 He notes that if there
is no extra incentive for a corporation to put in place all of the
necessary protections, it will not do so.6
Evidence shows that existing procedural protections in the
United States are neither sufficient nor been implemented to
1. See, e.g., In re MFW Shareholders Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 500–01 (Del. Ch.
2013).
2. The Wall Street Journal named Strine “one of corporate law’s biggest
personalities,” and in January 2014, he was appointed Chief Justice of the
Supreme Court of Delaware. Liz Hoffman, Leo Strine Nominated to Head
Delaware Supreme Court, WALL ST. J., Jan. 08, 2014,
http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023043479045793084329
48927494?mg=reno64-
wsj&url=http%3A%2F%2Fonline.wsj.com%2Farticle%2FSB10001424052702
304347904579308432948927494.html.
3. In reMFW Shareholders Litig., 67 A.3d at 500–01.
4. Generally, risk management and fraud-prevention programs consist of
some form of processes and procedures. For an example of one such program
drafted by a leading global consultancy firm, see KPMG FORENSIC, FRAUD
RISK MANAGEMENT (2006),
http://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Docume
nts/Fraud-Risk-Management-O-200610.pdf (describing the various processes
required to minimize fraud risk).
5. In reMFW Shareholders Litig., 67 A.3d at 501.
6. Id.
I
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prevent excessive risk taking7 and fraud.8 Moreover, well re-
spected scholars such as Partnoy and Crotty trace the causes of
the 2008 financial crisis to excessive risk taking and fast-paced
decision making.9 At the same time, the predominant employ-
ment relationship within the United States is an “at-will” sys-
tem, under which employers can dismiss workers for any rea-
son.10 This means most individuals do not have any redress
when they lose their jobs,11 even if layoffs are due to risky deci-
sions or worse, fraud by company executives.
In the United States, risky decisions that amount to negli-
gence or recklessness and cause harm to both people’s property
and bodies usually fall within the purview of torts.12 While it
could be argued that the harm resulting from a loss of employ-
ment equals or even exceeds the harm that tort law considers
in ensuring remedies for those who have suffered physical inju-
ry,13 under the law the loss of a job is seen as a purely economic
loss that tort law does not recognize.14 Moreover, corporate law
of limited liability often overrides tort norms.15
7. JAMES CROTTY, STRUCTURAL CAUSES OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS: A
CRITICAL ASSESSMENT OF THE “NEW FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE” 4 (2009).
8. Jason Ryan, Fraud ‘Directly Related’ to Financial Crisis Probed, ABC
NEWS, Feb. 11, 2009,
http://abcnews.go.com/TheLaw/Economy/story?id=6855179&page=1.
9. Frank Partnoy, Don’t Blink Snap Decisions and Securities Regulation,
77 BROOK. L. REV. 151, 163 (2011). Drawing a link between executives’ focus
on short-term time horizons and fast-paced decision making, one scholar not-
ed that New York Stock Exchange turnover reached or exceeded 100 percent
annually in all but one of the seven years immediately preceding the 2008
financial crisis, thus contributing to the bubble that eventually burst. James
Crotty, The Bonus-Driven “Rainmaker” Financial Firm: How These Firms
Enrich Top Employees, Destroy Shareholder Value and Create Systemic Fi-
nancial Instability 12 (Polit. Econ. Res. Inst., Working Paper Series No. 209,
2011).
10. Deborah A. DeMott, Investing in Work: Wilkes As an Employment Law
Case, 33 W. NEW. ENG. L. REV. 497, 497 (2011).
11. See generally, Ellen Dannin, Why At-Will Employment is Bad for Em-
ployers and Just Cause is Good for Them, 58 LAB. L.J., no. 5, 2007.
12. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 281 (AM. LAW INST. 1965).
13. Norman Beale, Susan Nethecott, Job-loss and Family Morbidity: a
Study of a Factory Closure, 35 J. ROYAL C. GEN. PRAC. 510 (1985) (discussing
scientific studies linking significant health deterioration with job losses).
14. Anita Bernstein, Keep It Simple: An Explanation of the Rule of No Re-
covery for Pure Economic Loss, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 773 (2006).
15. Daniel Greenwood, Torts in Corporate Law: Do Corporations Have Fi-
duciary Obligation to Commit Torts? 3–4 (University of Utah Legal Studies
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This Note argues that stronger employment protection laws,
such as those that exist in Europe, provide alternative avenues
through which corporate processes can be made meaningful,
rather than merely mechanistic, resulting in improved corpo-
rate accountability.
One solution, as seen in Germany and described below in
Part III(C) of this Note, is the introduction of broad-based em-
ployment protection systems, coupled with the representation
of labor interests in corporate decision making. A second meth-
od, which might be more politically palatable in the United
States, is to expand the public-policy exception to employment
“at-will,”16 to include situations where termination takes place
due to the wrongdoing of the employer and would entitle the
employee to reinstatement or compensatory damages. If em-
ployees had broader protections, corporations would be forced
to slow down their decision making, thus allowing sufficient
lead time for required employee-notification periods and possi-
ble appeals. In addition, employee-termination costs must not
be manipulated in the same way as other expenses, as execu-
tives manipulate such costs to optimize short–term results.
With more protective employment laws, employees would have
more leeway to monitor and speak out against company’s ac-
tions that impact their continued employment, without worry-
ing about potential retaliation. Finally, if employees become
part of the decision-making process, the stakes represented at
the table will become more reflective of the corporation’s long-
term interests.
Part I of this Note provides a background discussion on the
relationship between employment laws and corporate account-
ability. Part II describes the corporate-governance system in
the United States. Additionally, it sheds light on the state of
U.S. legislation related to layoffs, with particular emphasis on
the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act
Research Paper Series, Research Paper No. 05-06, 2005),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=776206&download=yes.
16. “In legal terms . . . since the last half of the 19th century, employment
in each of the United States has been ‘at-will,’ or terminable by either the
employer or employee for any reason whatsoever.” Charles J. Muhl, The Em-
ployment At-Will Doctrine: Three Major Exceptions, MONTHLY LAB. REV., 3
(Jan. 2001). Thus, “at-will” employment means an employee may be fired at
any time, regardless of whether his or her employer has just cause or pro-
vides advance notice or warning. Id.
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(“WARN Act”),17 which is the primary source of employee pro-
tection during mass dismissals. Part III examines international
norms, including those of the International Labor Organization
and the European Union, while providing an in–depth analysis
of the laws in one EU Member State – Germany. Part IV de-
scribes corporate-governance systems that are dominant in Eu-
rope. Part V provides a comparative analysis of corporate and
employment laws in the United States and Germany. Part VI
offers recommendations on improving employee protections and
proposes an alternative torts fault-based system where those
who commit fraud are liable to employees who lose their jobs as
a result of it.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Corporate Governance – What Do Directors Owe, and to
Whom?
The U.S. government’s Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission18
determined that the 2008 crisis was brought about by the com-
bination of failures in government regulation combined with
corporate mismanagement and excessive and unjustified risk
taking by Wall Street executives.19 Excessive corporate risk
taking is fueled by the fact that the decision makers are shield-
ed by the Business Judgment Rule (“BJR”).20 Further, even in
instances where it is recognized that the BJR should not apply
17. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, 29
U.S.C.A. § 2101 (2000).
18. Congress established the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in May
2009 following the 2008 financial crisis and as part of the Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act. It is an independent panel made up of ten private experts
who held hearings, conducted interviews, and reviewed documents over the
course of a year and published a report, which concluded that the financial
crisis was avoidable. See generally FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N,
http://fcic.law.stanford.edu (last visited July 3, 2015).
19. NAT’L COMM. ON THE CAUSES OF THE FIN. AND ECON. CRISIS IN THE U.S.,
THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT, at xviii–xxi (2011). See generally,
MARK JICKLING, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40173, CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS (2010).
20. “[T]he business judgment rule shields directors from personal liability
if, upon review, the court concludes that director’s decision can be attributed
to any rational business purpose.” Unitrin, Inc. v. Am. Gen. Corp., 651 A.2d
1361, 1374 (Del. 1995) (citing Sinclair Oil Corp. v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720
(Del. 1971)).
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due to violations of fiduciary duties by directors, corporate de-
cision makers are protected by statutory provisions.21 Risk tak-
ing is further reinforced by the fast pace of the markets and
speed with which decisions need to be made.22
The core of corporate law in the United States is founded on
an assumption that good process leads to good decisions. In
many ways directors’ and officers’ fiduciary duties of care and
loyalty can be discharged by ensuring that decisions were made
through a process.23 For example, the very definition of “duty of
care” is that decisions are made in compliance with a corporate
process.24 Furthermore, a subsection of duty of loyalty – the
duty of good faith – is comprised of the directors’ “duty to put in
place an oversight mechanism and process.”25 Finally, the
cleansing options available to directors in ensuring discharge of
their duty of loyalty are those of ratification by either the
board, shareholders, or both,26 which again implies a process
through which decisions are made. Thus, while U.S. Courts
have shied away from getting involved in business decisions,
they have deemed that their function of ensuring justice is ful-
filled when they confirm that directors follow a certain process.
In reviewing corporate decisions, the Delaware Court of
Chancery assesses two aspects of the process: time and infor-
mation.27 Time is evaluated in terms of the duration and the
number of meetings, presentations, etc., as well as in terms of
the total length of time taken to arrive at a decision.28 The
Court evaluates information in terms of the quantity of expert
advice available, from both internal and external experts, and
21. For example, §102(b)(7) of the Delaware Code permits a certificate of
incorporation to contain an exculpatory clause that absolves directors of lia-
bility for violating the duty of care. DEL. CODEANN. tit. 8, § 102(b)(7) (2011).
22. See generally Partnoy, supra note 9.
23. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 875 (Del. 1985), overruled on oth-
er grounds by Gantler v. Stephens, 965 A.2d 695 (Del. 2009).
24. Id. at 873.
25. In re Caremark Int’l Inc. Derivative Litig., 698 A.2d 959, 967 (Del. Ch.
1996).
26. In reMFW Litig., 67 A.3d 496, 504 (Del. Ch. 2013).
27. See, e.g., Smith, 488 A.2d at 872; Moran v. Household Int’l, Inc., 490
A.2d 1059, 1075 (Del. Ch. 1985); S. Muoio & Co. v. Hallmark Entm’t Invs.
Co., No. 4729-CC, 2011 WL 863007, at *13–14 (Del. Ch. Mar. 9, 2011).
28. S. Muoio & Co., 2011 WL 863007, at *14.
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the number of studies commissioned.29 In other words, the
Court looks at the process without assessing the content,30 and
has thus created a system of corporate decision making based
on a checklist, rather than true due diligence. In extreme cases,
companies hire “financial advisors” and commission “studies”
just to create a show of following a process to satisfy the re-
quirement.31 Yet even in the best cases, outside consultants are
dependent on the corporations that contract them for their
source of income, and might be compelled to please the compa-
ny in order to ensure that they will get return business.32
B. What about the Workers?
However, one area where corporations do not need to follow
any process is in the termination of “at-will” employees.33 In
most cases, companies can lay off thousands of people immedi-
ately and without any future liability.34 Time is not an issue in
these fast-paced decisions to terminate employees, and the in-
formation that feeds into them can be spurious. Sometimes
these decisions are aimed at maximization of profits, while oth-
er times terminations seem inevitable due to a company’s lack
29. In re Gaylord Container Corp. S’holders Litig., 753 A.2d 462, 479 n.57
(Del. Ch. 2000).
30. WILLIAM A. KLEIN ET AL., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE 157
(11th ed. 2010).
31. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc. is an extreme case where members of a major-
ity shareholder’s personnel conducted a study to assess the feasibility of ac-
quiring a target’s outstanding shares over a weekend without even visiting
the company, and the financial advisor signed off on the report despite that
the price – the very feasibility of which was in question – was left blank. 457
A.2d 701, 712 (Del. 1983). In 2001, Enron paid its accounting firm, Arthur
Andersen, $25 million in audit fees in addition to the millions it paid in con-
sulting fees. Enron: The Real Scandal, ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2002,
http://www.economist.com/node/940091 [hereinafter The Real Scandal]. An-
dersen later admitted to overstating profits and understating debts in En-
ron’s financial statements, and the accounting firm was indicted for shred-
ding documents related to Enron’s sudden bankruptcy that resulted from
fraudulent business practices. Id.
32. Joel. S. Demski, Corporate Conflict of Interest, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 51,
61–65 (2003) (providing an overview of dependence and conflict of interest
between corporations and their consultants, financial advisers, and lawyers).
33. See Dannin, supra note 11.
34. There is a narrow exemption for terminating at-will employees under
the WARN Act, see 29 U.S.C. § 2103 (2000), which is discussed in detail later
in this note, see infra Part II.C.
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of capital or its inability to pay its employees.35 Lack of funds,
however, might be merely a symptom, rather than a cause.
While there can be legitimate factors resulting in the loss of a
company’s operational funds, excessive risk taking as well as
fraudulent activity are also to blame.
One way to prove causation between fraud and mass layoffs
or individual terminations is through a thorough analysis of
accounts. Another way is through an examination of both the
temporal sequence and the proximity between fraudulent activ-
ity and layoffs, which may indicate that fraudulent decisions
almost certainly played some role in many of the large-scale
worker terminations of the last two decades. For example, En-
ron laid off four thousand workers.36 Additionally, Enron’s ac-
counting firm, Arthur Anderson, terminated seven thousand
employees in 2002,37 after it became evident that Enron execu-
tives had engaged in fraudulent business practices, utilized
questionable accounting to conceal debts, overvalued the com-
pany’s stock and overstated its earnings figures.38 In late 2007
and early 2008, pharmaceutical company Bristol-Meyers-
Squibb laid off four thousand three hundred workers39 shortly
after the company settled a case alleging fraudulent marketing
and pricing practices.40 Kicking off the financial crisis in 2009,
AIG cut twenty thousand jobs41 just as its executives were
found to have been engaging in accounting fraud, bid rigging
35. Wayne F. Cascio, Downsizing: What Do We Know? What Have We
Learned?, 7 EXECUTIVE, 95, 96 (1993).
36. Rick Bragg, Enron’s Collapse: Workers; Workers Feel Pain of Layoffs
and Added Sting of Betrayal, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2002,
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/20/us/enron-s-collapse-workers-workers-
feel-pain-layoffs-added-sting-betrayal.html.
37. Arthur Anderson to Lay Off 7,000, Citing Enron Scandal Fallout,
TOPEKA CAPITAL-JOURNAL (Apr. 9, 2002),
http://cjonline.com/stories/040902/bus_andersen.shtml.
38. The Real Scandal, supra note 31.
39. Stephanie Saul, Bristol-Meyers to Eliminate 4,800 Jobs, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 6 2007,
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/06/business/06bristol.html?_r=0.
40. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, Bristol-Meyers-Squibb to Pay More than $515 Million
to Resolve Allegations of Illegal Drug Marketing and Pricing (Sept. 28, 2007),
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/2007/September/07_civ_782.html.
41. Hugh Son, AIG Cut 20,000 Jobs in 2009 on Asset Sales, Defections,
Layoffs, BLOOMBERG BUS. NEWS (Feb. 26, 2010),
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aSc5QyNYLd.Q
.
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schemes, and stock price manipulation, resulting in cases that
were later settled out of court.42
In each of these cases, it could be argued that the fines and
penalties the companies had to pay justified the layoffs as a
cost-saving move. However, had the company executives not
engaged in fraud to begin with, the fines and penalties would
not have been implemented. Thus, there is a direct link be-
tween the fraud and termination of employees.43 More recently
in late 2013, Caterpillar Inc. (“Caterpillar”) laid off thirteen
thousand employees during an ongoing investigation concern-
ing a wholly owned subsidiary that both allegedly engaged in
improper billing for unnecessary replacement of parts that
were still in good repair and in dumping those parts and tools
at sea to hide the evidence.44 Several months earlier, in late
2012, Caterpillar acquired a Chinese company that within
months proved to have been overstating its profits for years,45 a
fact that Caterpillar’s lawyers, auditors, and executives did not
catch during the company’s hasty purchase of the subsidiary.46
This example illustrates that fast-paced and risky decision
making itself could result in losses that necessitate layoffs in
certain cases.
The purpose of fraud-prevention processes is to ensure due
diligence; however, when process is followed merely for show,
42. Paul Smalera, AIG Settles Longstanding Fraud Cases for $1 Billion,
CNN MONEY (July 16, 2010),
http://money.cnn.com/2010/07/16/news/companies/AIG_Ohio_billion-
dollar_settlement.fortune/.
43. Christopher Harress, Caterpillar (CAT) Slashing Jobs, Closing Plants
Across the World as Equipment Demands From Global Mining Industry
Drops, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Jan. 22, 2013), http://www.ibtimes.com/caterpillar-
cat-slashing-jobs-closing-plants-across-world-equipment-demands-global-
mining-industry.
44. James R. Hagerty, Caterpillar Probed for Possibly Dumping Train
Parts in Pacific Ocean, WALL ST. J., Nov. 22, 2013,
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304607104579212410752833
816; James B. Kelleher, Caterpillar to Close Another Mining Equipment
Plant, REUTERS (Nov. 15, 2013, 5:59 PM),
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/11/15/us-caterpillar-mining-layoffs-
idUSBRE9AE17O20131115.
45. Simon Montlake, Alleged Fraud at Caterpillar’s Chinese Acquisition
Puts Spotlight on U.S. Principals, FORBES, Jan. 21, 2013,
http://www.forbes.com/sites/simonmontlake/2013/01/21/alleged-fraud-at-
caterpillars-chinese-acquisition-puts-spotlight-on-u-s-principals/.
46. Id.
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as in the Enron case, it loses this purpose. Many of the pro-
posed solutions for ensuring adherence to the spirit, rather
than merely the letter, of fraud-prevention processes focus on
ensuring that decision makers suffer consequences when their
decisions go wrong.47 The counterargument is that direct liabil-
ity for corporate decision making will result in corporate paral-
ysis – an inability to take risks, which could become an obstacle
to innovation.48 Both these viewpoints have merit and require a
balance somewhere in between. Another way of ensuring re-
sponsible decision making is to ensure that the costs of deci-
sions are built in into the very process of decision making itself.
If corporations are obliged to take into account the costs of ter-
minations as well as advance notice to be given to the employ-
ees, this obligation would force a more careful and appropriate-
ly paced decision- making process.
II. OVERVIEWOF THEU.S.-CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
SYSTEM AND LABOR LEGISLATION
A. Corporate Governance
There are two types of corporate-governance systems: the
shareholder-primacy model and the stakeholder-pluralist mod-
el.49 Under the shareholder-primacy model, which is dominant
in the United States, corporate decision makers serve the in-
terests of shareholders exclusively, by maximizing profits.50 In
contrast, under a stakeholder-pluralist model, decision makers
have to take into account a wider range of interests, including
both shareholders and stakeholders, such as employees.51 Ah-
lering and Deakin, respected British experts on international
labor and employment practices, argue that the corporate-
47. See generally, John Armour & Jeffrey N. Gordon, Systemic Harms and
Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS, no. 1, 2014.
48. David Rosenberg, Supplying the Adverb: The Future of Corporate Risk-
Taking and the Business Judgment Rule, 6 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 216, 218–219
(2009).
49. Klaus J. Hopt, Comparative Corporate Governance: The State of the Art
and International Regulation 29–30 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working
Paper No. 170/2011, 2011),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1713750.
50. Id.
51. Tom C. Hodge, The Treatment of Employees As Stakeholders in the
European Union: Current and Future Trends, 38 SYRACUSE J. INT’L L. & COM.
91, 103 (2010).
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governance system where corporations are accountable only to
shareholders necessarily produces a system with limited-
employee protections.52
Corporate law in the United States is predominately gov-
erned by state law.53 Although there are variations, state laws
in essence only recognize two fiduciary duties owed by directors
of companies – the duty of care and the duty of loyalty.54 Note
that these duties are owed solely to the shareholders, and
shareholders are the only ones that can bring actions for viola-
tions.55
B. Overview of Relevant Laws on Employment Termination
The United States ranks last on the Organization for Eco-
nomic Cooperation and Development (“OECD”)56 Employment
Protection Strictness index.57 This index measures the complex
52. Beth Ahlering & Simon Deakin, Labor Regulation, Corporate Govern-
ance, and Legal Origin: A Case of Institutional Complementarity?, 41 LAW &
SOC’Y REV. 865, 865–76 (2007).
53. Steven M. Davidoff, Despite Worries, Serving at the Top Carries Little
Risk, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2011
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/06/07/despite-worries-serving-at-the-top-
carries-little-risk/?_r=0.
54. See Klein, supra note 30, at 156–63.
55. Id.
56. In 1960, eighteen European countries, Canada, and the United States
created the OECD in order to fight global poverty and promote economic
growth and financial stability through monitoring and provision of recom-
mendations to developing countries. The OECD is now comprised of thirty-
four members, representing the world’s most advanced economies, which ne-
gotiate binding agreements and voluntary guidelines on a range of topics re-
lated to the economy, including trade, transparency, and social policies such
as labor rights. The Organization also has a permanent Secretariat in Paris,
where a staff of economists, lawyers, and other experts monitor implementa-
tion of agreements in member countries and follow economic developments
outside the OECD area. On the basis of data collected by these experts, the
Secretariat publishes reports that form the basis of the OECD Council’s rec-
ommendations. What We Do and How, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/about/whatwedoandhow/ (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
57. The OECD collects data on twenty-one different aspects of employment
protection legislation or regulations in member states. On this basis, it is
possible to assess the costs to employers that result from procedures designed
to protect workers from individual or group dismissals relative to the costs of
hiring workers on fixed-term contracts or through temporary agencies. The
OECD also evaluates social costs that accrue from mass dismissals and advo-
cates a balance between corporate efficiency and worker protection. Indica-
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of processes that are in place before an employee can be termi-
nated.58 In other words, out of thirty-four OECD member
states, it is easiest to be fired or laid off in the United States,59
since with some narrow exceptions, immediate notice of termi-
nation is effective there without any limitation.60
tors of Employment Protection, OECD,
http://www.oecd.org/employment/emp/oecdindicatorsofemploymentprotection.
htm (last visited Jan. 10, 2014).
58. Id.
59. OECD, EMPLOYMENT OUTLOOK 86–87, 110 (2013), http://www.oecd-
ili-
brary.org/docserver/download/8113181e.pdf?expires=1435955581&id=id&acc
name=ocid45121179&checksum=08F49B3268565995C6415C7D79FA575C.
60. See id. at 79–80.
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Figure 161: Protection of Permanent Workers against Individ-
ual and Collected Dismissals OECD Economic Outlook Report
2013.
61. Id. at 86. New Zealand lacks data on collective dismissals. As figure 1
above shows, the OECD member country with the most employee protections
is Germany, followed by Belgium and the Netherlands.
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In reference to the diagram above, the countries on the right-
hand side of the spectrum, in contrast to the United States,
have established laws that limit employers’ ability to terminate
employees by providing protective measures. Such protective
measures include requiring that employees be notified of the
cause for their dismissal, have notice of their termination, and
receive severance pay.62
Indeed, the at-will employment framework in the United
States, coupled with the decline in unionization,63 has resulted
in a situation where an employee may be fired for any reason,
without even being informed of the reason. Presumably, the at-
will framework is set up to ensure maximum mobility of the
workforce,64 allowing parties on both sides of the bargain to
terminate employment at any point, subject to contractual
stipulations.65 However the assumption that employment is a
contractual relationship, where each party has a chance to bar-
gain, is especially false in the wake of high unemployment
rates and the fact that increased specialization of industries
leaves many employees vulnerable to the only company (or one
of very few companies) that requires a particular skill set.66 In
fact, public-opinion studies show that, given the choice, em-
ployees would not prefer an at-will employment relationship.67
62. ANGELIKA MULLER, LABOUR LAW REFORMS AT THE CROSSROADS OF ILO
STANDARDS ANDOECD ANDWORLD BANK’S INDEXES 4 (2012).
63. In 2012, the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics observed a continued drop
in the number of unionized workers to 11.3 percent, a ninty-seven-year low.
Steven Greenhouse, Share of the Work Force in a Union Falls to a 97-Year
Low, 11.3%, N.Y. TIMES, Jan 28, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/24/business/union-membership-drops-
despite-job-growth.html.
64. Jason P. Lemons, For Any Reason or No Reason at All: Reconciling
Employment-at-Will with the Rights of Texas Workers after Mission Petrole-
um Carriers, Inc. v. Solomon, 35 ST. MARY’S L.J. 741, 766 (2004); see also
DeMott, supra note 10, at 508.
65. Lawrence E. Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On
Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404,
1416 (1967).
66. See DeMott, supra note 10, at 507.
67. The results of one survey showed that 82.2 percent of participants be-
lieved it was illegal to fire employees solely to cut costs, id. at 511, thereby
demonstrating that at-will employment violates the prevailing societal un-
derstanding and expectations of employment law. Similar views were ex-
pressed by employment law experts in the New York City area that the au-
thor of this Note interviewed. One interviewed expert noted that “the reason
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Another example is presented by a review of the employment
contracts of Chief Executive Officers (“CEOs”), demonstrating
that these employees, who have the negotiating power to
choose, very rarely go for an at-will arrangement; indeed, 86.93
percent of CEOs’ contracts include for-cause employment pro-
tections.68 In contrast, the only protection available to a regular
U.S. employee is unemployment insurance, which runs a max-
imum of twenty-six weeks,69 with a cap on the weekly allow-
ance set by the state.70 This insurance is not available to an
employee if he or she is terminated due to misconduct or upon
his or her own will.71 Additionally, the employee does not re-
ceive any additional protections if the employer is found to
have engaged in misconduct, representing a lopsided bargain.72
we have so many ‘frivolous’ employment discrimination claims today is be-
cause of the mismatch between people’s sense of justice and what the law
offers them.” In other words, plaintiffs who are unjustly (but legally) termi-
nated attempt bring claims in employment law within the narrow protections
of anti-discrimination laws.
68. See DeMott, supra note 10, at 512.
69. Most states provide a maximum of twenty-six weeks of unemployment
insurance. Until December 2013, if a worker was unable to find a job after
twenty-six weeks, the temporary federal Emergency Unemployment Com-
pensation program of 2008 (EUC) allowed the unemployed to collect up to
fourteen additional weeks of benefits. CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES,
POLICY BASICS, How Many Weeks of Unemployment Insurance are Available?
(Mar. 9, 2015), http://www.cbpp.org/files/PolicyBasics_UI_Weeks.pdf; The
EUC, however, expired on December 28, 2013. Rebecca Kaplan, Extension of
Unemployment Benefits Dead in Senate for Now, CBS NEWS (Jan. 14, 2014),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/extension-of-unemployment-benefits-dead-in-
senate-for-now/; Glenn Blain, State Unemployment Benefits on the Rise, N.Y.
DAILY NEWS, Sept. 17, 2014,
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/state-unemployment-
benefits-rise-blog-entry-1.1943215.
70. In New York, unemployed workers can collect a maximum of $420 each
week. Celeste Katz, State Unemployment Benefits on the Rise, DAILY POLITICS
(Sept. 17, 2014, 4:19 PM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/blogs/dailypolitics/state-unemployment-
benefits-rise-blog-entry-1.1943215.
71. Chad Stone & William Chen, Introduction to Unemployment Insurance,
CTR. ON BUDGET AND POL’Y PRIORITIES 3 (July 30, 2014),
http://www.cbpp.org/files/12-19-02ui.pdf.
72. Id. In other words, if an employee is terminated due to corporate mis-
management, or even due to an employer’s illegal activity, the employee’s
only recourse is unemployment insurance.
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This system creates costs to be absorbed by society, thus ef-
fectively subsidizing corporations.73 The WARN Act is the only
legislation that addresses the issue of massive layoffs by impos-
ing a notice requirement for layoffs of over fifty people within a
period of thirty days.74 Ironically, the only notice requirement
mandated by U.S. legislation may not apply in cases where the
underlying reason for a layoff is fraud or excessive risk tak-
ing.75
C. The WARN Act
The WARN Act76 was designed to protect workers by obligat-
ing employers to give their employees advanced notice of plant
closings and massive layoffs.77 For the WARN Act to apply, a
company must have one hundred or more employees who
worked more than six of the past twelve months and who aver-
aged over twenty hours per week.78 The WARN Act defines a
plant closing as a termination of fifty or more employees at a
single site due to shut-down of the plant.79 Additionally, the
WARN Act defines a mass layoff as the termination of 33 per-
cent or more of full-time employees80 at a single job site.81
The WARN Act is construed narrowly, and on its face it only
applies to a very limited number of employers.82 In fact, the
73. See Armour & Gordon, supra note 47, at 39.
74. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, 29
U.S.C.A. § 2101 (2000).
75. The narrowness of the WARN Act and its multiple exclusionary provi-
sions result in many layoffs falling outside the Act’s scope. This issue is dis-
cussed in detail further in this Note. See infra Part C.
76. This Note focuses on the federal WARN Act. State variations of the
statute exist in Connecticut, Maryland, Minnesota, Tennessee, New Jersey,
Illinois, Wisconsin, California, Ohio and Tennessee.
77. Zach Duffy, AFL-CIO, The Public Availability of WARN Notices 6
(2010),
http://www.aflcio.org/content/download/11811/146071/AFLCIO_Public+Avail
+of+WARN_final.pdf.
78. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act § 2101.
79. Id.
80. Id. When 50–499 employees are terminated, the WARN Act applies if
those terminated constitute at least 33 percent of the company’s employees.
Termination of more than 499 employees is subject to the WARN Act regard-
less of the company’s size. 29 U.S.C. § 2101.
81. Duffy, supra note 77, at 6.
82. Id.
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WARN Act is consistently criticized for under-inclusiveness.83
Not only does the WARN Act have explicit exceptions where
the notice requirement does not apply, there are also defini-
tional limitations that put many terminations outside of the
purview of the Act.84 One of these limitations is the definition
of “employer” for the purposes of the WARN Act.85 While both
full-time and part-time employees are entitled to notice of ter-
mination under the WARN Act, part-time employees do not
count towards the number of employees that would put the
employer within the definition of “employer” for the purposes of
the Act.86 Furthermore, the WARN Act defines “part-time” em-
ployees broadly, by including those who work an average of less
than twenty hours per week and those employed for fewer than
six of the twelve months before the date of the required notice,
regardless of number of hours worked.87
Another definitional limitation of the WARN Act is the term
“employment loss,”88 which has fostered much litigation since
the Act was passed. Under the WARN Act, an “employment
loss” is a “layoff of six months or longer, or a fifty percent or
more decrease in working hours within a six-month period.”89
Further, the WARN Act specifically states what is not consid-
ered an employment loss: “[I]f a closing or layoff results from a
relocation or merger with another company, and the employees
are offered positions at a new or different location within a rea-
sonable distance (with less than a six-month break in employ-
ment), then the Act does not recognize an ‘employment loss.’”90
In addition, accepting an offer to relocate within thirty days of
termination puts an employee outside the definition of “em-
ployment loss.”91
83. Id.
84. Gary S. Mogel, Proof of Failure to Provide WARN Act Notice, in 27 AM.
JUR. PROOF OF FACTS § 12 (3d ed. 1994).
85. Id.
86. Id. The fact that the WARN Act only applies to employers with more
than one hundred full-time employees means many medium-sized businesses,
which often employ only part-time workers, fall outside the Act’s coverage.
87. Id.
88. Id. §5.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id.
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1. Exceptions:
In addition to the definitional limitations stated above, the
WARN Act also provides for several exceptions including: tem-
porary employment, strikes and lockouts, faltering employers,
unforeseeable business circumstances, reasonable belief, and
elimination of liability for good faith. First, under temporary
employment, if the employer notified the employee in advance
that the employment was only for a limited duration, then no
notice of termination is required.92 Second, the WARN Act does
not apply93 if a closing or mass layoff falls under the definition
of a “strike or … a lockout not intended to evade the require-
ments.”94 In addition, an employer can terminate an employee
who is considered an “economic striker” under the National
Labor Relations Act.95 Nevertheless, the employer is obliged to
give notice to non-striking employees.96
Under the third exception, known as “faltering employer,” the
WARN Act stipulates that if a business would be harmed fur-
ther or would be unable to make a comeback as a result of in-
formation going public, by giving notice to employees, then it
“shall give as much notice as practicable and at that time shall
give a brief statement of the basis for reducing the notification
period.”97 The fourth exception is the “Unforeseeable Business
Circumstances” exception, which excuses employers from the
notice requirement if business circumstances arise “that were
not reasonably foreseeable as of the time that notice would
have been required.”98 Unforeseeable is defined as a “sudden,
dramatic, and unexpected” action over which the employer has
no control.99 As the WARN Act is rather vague on the parame-
ters of “unforeseeability,” this provision has invited the most
litigation.100
92. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, 29
U.S.C.A. § 2101 (2000).
93. Sandra J. Mullings, Warn: Judicial Treatment of Exemptions, Exclu-
sions, and Excuses, 39 ARIZ. L. REV. 1209, 1213 (1997).
94. Id.
95. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act § 2103.
96. Mullings, supra note 93.
97. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act § 2102.
98. SeeMogel, supra note 84, §16.
99. Id.
100. Id.
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Fifth, the WARN Act allows employers who reasonably be-
lieved that the termination would be for less than six months to
make such a showing in good faith, in which case they become
exempt from the sixty-day notice requirement.101 The employer
is still required to notify workers as soon as it becomes appar-
ent that an employment loss is inevitable.102 And finally, even
if a WARN Act violation has occurred, the Court can eliminate
the employer’s liability if the employer “proves to the satisfac-
tion of the court that the act or omission that violated WARN
was in good faith and … the employer had reasonable grounds
[to] believe … that [it] was not a violation.”103 Surprisingly, this
exemption has not caused excessive litigation, since courts
have been firm in requiring both subjective intent to comply
with the statute and that employers apply the statute with ob-
jective reasonableness.104
2. Remedies
The WARN Act provides an exclusive list of possible reme-
dies. It entitles employees who have suffered employment loss-
es to sixty days’ worth of back pay and benefits.105 In addition,
employees can be reimbursed for reasonable attorneys’ fees,
litigation costs, and prejudgment interest.106 No punitive dam-
ages are possible under the WARN Act. Additionally, the
WARN Act specifically states that no injunction is possible
from a plant closing or layoff.107 Although the WARN Act con-
tains an exclusive remedies provision,108 it further specifies
that remedies provided by the Act are in addition to, rather
than in substitute of, those that are provided in employee con-
tracts.109
As demonstrated above, the limited protections given by the
WARN Act have very limited coverage. Given that the record-
keeping of the WARN Act is only done at the state level, there
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. SeeMullings, supra note 93, at 1254.
104. Id.
105. SeeMogel, supra note 84, §26.
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, 29
U.S.C.A. § 2104 (2000).
109. SeeMogel, supra note 84, §26.
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is no national data that would allow us to assess the proportion
of terminations covered by the Act.110 However the only availa-
ble calculations at national level, conducted by the Government
Accountability Office in 2003, showed that in more than 65
percent of instances employees were given two weeks or less
notice, while employees in 32 percent of terminations were not
given any notice at all.111 Thus, U.S. employment law is in di-
rect contrast to international law, EU legislation, and the laws
of individual EU member states, where employees enjoy con-
siderable protections against termination.
III. INTERNATIONAL AND EU LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT
LAW
A. International Law
The International Labor Organization’s (“ILO”)112 Termina-
tion of Employment Convention (“Convention No. 158”)113 and
its supplement, the Termination of Employment Recommenda-
tion (“Recommendation No. 166”), are the two main ILO in-
struments dealing with unilateral termination by employers.114
Together, these instruments outline valid and invalid reasons
for termination and prohibit termination without cause.115
Termination for economic reasons is one of the permissive rea-
sons and requires reasonable notice and a consultation process
before dismissal.116 The exact term used in the Convention to
110. Duffy, supra note 77, at 7–8.
111. Id. at 5.
112. ILO is the United Nations Specialized Agency on Labor and Employ-
ment mandated to coordinate and monitor international employment stand-
ards. Part of its work is done through reporting and research on implementa-
tion and compliance with Conventions that set out international labor and
employment standards discussed in this section. About the ILO, INT’L LAB.
ORG., http://www.ilo.org/global/about-the-ilo/lang--en/index.htm (last visited
Aug. 13, 2015).
113. Thirty-six countries have ratified the Convention between 1983 and
2002. However, the United States and United Kingdom have not ratified the
Convention. Ratifications of C158–Termination of Employment Convention,
INT’L LAB. ORG.,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/normlex/en/f?p=1000:11300:0::NO:11300:P11300_INS
TRUMENT_ID:312303 (last visited Oct. 12, 2013).
114. SeeMuller, supra note 62, at 2.
115. Convention Concerning Termination of Employment at the Initiative of
the Employer, art. 4, June 22, 1982, 1412 U.N.T.S. 160.
116. Id. art. 13.
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refer to an economic justification for terminating employment
is “operational requirements,” but neither the Convention No.
158 nor the Recommendation No. 166 specifically defines
these.117 In one report on the Convention No. 158, the ILO ex-
plains that “operational requirements generally include rea-
sons of an economic, technological, structural or similar na-
ture.”118 The report continues that, “Dismissals resulting from
these reasons may be individual or collective and may involve
reduction of the workforce or closure of the undertaking.”119
B. European Union
EU labor laws are consistent with ILO Convention No. 158.
Per EU regulations, it is illegal in all the EU-Member States to
terminate an employee without cause.120 Moreover, directive
98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the Approximation of the Laws of
the Member States Relating to Collective Redundancies man-
dates certain types of notification before any mass layoff.121 For
instance, if an employer plans any layoffs, he must notify pub-
lic authorities in writing at least thirty days in advance of
these layoffs.122 He must also forward a copy of the notification
to the workers’ representatives, so that they can send com-
ments to the competent public authority, who uses the thirty-
day period to seek solutions to avoid the layoff.123 Individual
EU-Member States may decide either to shorten this period or
to mandate a longer advance-notification period up to sixty
days. If a layoff is pursuant to a judicial decision, such notifica-
tion is not necessary.124
117. INT’L LABOUR ORG., NOTE ON CONVENTION NO. 158 AND
RECOMMENDATION NO. 166 CONCERNING TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT 2
(2009),
http://www.ilo.org/wcmsp5/groups/public/@ed_norm/@normes/documents/mee
tingdocument/wcms_100768.pdf.
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. DIRECTORATE GENERAL EMPLOYMENT, SOCIAL AFFAIRS AND EQUAL
OPPORTUNITIES, EUR. COMM’N, TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT RELATIONSHIPS 3
(2006).
121. Id. at 87.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Council Directive 98/59 on the Approximation of the Laws of the Mem-
ber States Relating to Collective Redundancies, 1998 O.J. (L 225) 18 (EC).
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Member States have a choice of adopting one of several defi-
nitions of redundancy, namely “layoff” or “collective dismissal.”
The first definition of layoff is dependent on the size of the
company. In establishments normally employing more than
twenty and less than one hundred workers, the termination of
ten or more workers is deemed a layoff.125 In establishments
normally employing at least one hundred but less than three
hundred workers, a termination must affect at least 10 percent
of workers to be considered a layoff.126 Finally, if a company
employs three hundred or more workers, a termination of thir-
ty or more workers would count as a layoff.127 Under the second
formulation, a layoff has occurred if “over a period of ninety
days, at least twenty workers are made redundant, whatever
the number of workers normally employed in the establish-
ments in question.”128 Even before layoffs occur, employees
through their representatives have a right to request specific
information with regard to the planned layoffs, such as reasons
for the layoff, the type and number of workers affected, the cri-
teria used by management to decide which workers to termi-
nate, the proposed compensation, etc.129
It is national courts that hold EU-Member States accountable
for compliance with this EU-level directive.130 For example, in
USDAW v Ethel Austin Ltd, the United Kingdom’s Employ-
ment Appeal Tribunal held that U.K. legislation did not comply
with EU law on redundancies.131 The result of the USDAW rul-
ing is that collective dismissal regulations apply whenever
twenty or more employees are terminated within ninety days,
irrespective of branch locations.132
125. Employee Involvement – Collective Redundancies, EUROPEAN
COMMISSION,
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=707&langId=en&intPageId=215
(last accessed January 17, 2014).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Council Directive 98/59 , supra note 124, at 16, 17.
130. Id. at 17.
131. USDAW v. Ethel Austin Ltd. (In Administration), 2013 WL 3197285
(2013) (UK).
132. Id. The defendant company in this case argued that the threshold of
twenty terminations must all occur at a single location, which dramatically
narrowed the application of European Council Directive 98/59.
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As described above, EU directives and regulations provide
many protections for workers during termination. These pro-
tections are considered a minimum, unless stated otherwise,
and some Member States such as Germany go far beyond these
provisions.133 All EU Member States prohibit termination
without cause. At the same time, all of them recognize “eco-
nomic necessity” or “redundancy” as valid reasons for termina-
tion.134 Therefore, the additional layer of protections granted to
layoffs becomes very important.
C. National Laws in EU Member States – Germany as an ex-
ample
In Germany, employers’ ability to terminate workers is gov-
erned primarily by the statute Protection against Unjust Dis-
missal Act (“KSchG”).135 As will be demonstrated further, Ger-
many’s employee protections from and during terminations are
stronger than the minimums set by the European Union. In
compliance with the EC Directive, German employees can only
be fired for cause.136 In addition to employee misconduct, “oper-
ational requirements” constitute a valid reason.137 While the
statute does not define “operational requirements,” it not only
provides for any dismissal to be challenged in court, but also
triggers a statutory requirement to notify both the employee
and the Work Council138 or worker representative (if a Work
133. See Part III.B., infra..
134. DIRECTORATEGENERAL, supra note 120 at 3.
135. INT’L LABOUR ORG., Employment Security and Employment Termina-
tion: Germany,
http://www.ilo.org/dyn/natlex/natlex_browse.details?p_lang=en&p_country=D
EU&p_classification=10&p_origin=COUNTRY&p_sortby=SORTBY_COUNT
RY (last visited July 8, 2015).
136. AHRENS WALTER, LABOUR AND EMPLOYMENT 2013, GERMANY, GETTING
THEDEAL THROUGH SERIES, BLOOMBERG LAW, 1, 10.
137. Id.
138. Id. Employees are not required to form a Work Council, but if they
want to do so, they have the right to hold elections. For a Council to be
formed, at least five workers must be regularly employed in the company’s
organizational labor unit. The Council’s size depends on the number of
employees in the unit. Work Council members, along with members of the
election committee and candidates nominated to positions on the council
enjoy statutory protection against dismissal and can be terminated only for
serious cause. Different work councils have their own notification and
consultation rights, but the Work Constitution Act grants all councils the
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Council does not exist), as well as the Federal Employment
Agency.139
In most, if not all, collective dismissal cases, “operational re-
quirements” constitute the cause of dismissal. In Germany, the
definition of collective dismissal, a layoff, is generally broader
than that provided by the European Commission Directive on
redundancies described above. Specifically, it applies to situa-
tions where only five employees are terminated, as opposed to
the minimum of ten under EC Directive.140 In addition, the 10
percent rule applied to relatively bigger establishments in-
cludes companies that have at least sixty employees, as op-
posed to one hundred, as is the case under the EC Directive.141
In the case of larger companies, however, the EU threshold for
applying layoff regulations is lower. For example, in Germany
the same 10 percent rule applies for companies employing up to
five hundred employees, which means a minimum of fifty em-
ployees would have to be terminated for layoff provisions to ap-
ply.142 The EU Directive, however, defines layoff as termination
of thirty workers or more for companies employing three hun-
dred or more workers.143
As noted earlier, Work Councils or alternative representa-
tives of workers participate in company decision-making pro-
cesses in Germany. In the case of layoffs, the Work Council has
seven days to challenge an employer’s decision to terminate an
employee.144 In its termination notice, the employer must de-
scribe steps taken to pursue alternatives to the dismissal, in-
cluding reassigning the employee to a different department or
position.145 It is in the employer’s interest to disclose all infor-
mation available to the Work Council, as any information that
was not available at the stage of notification cannot be used in
any labor- court proceedings that might follow.146 The Work
right to participate in decisions related to personnel matters, including
hiring, transfers, and termination of employees. Id.
139. Id. at 11–12.
140. Id. at 11.
141. Id.
142. INT’L LABOURORG., supra note 135.
143. Directive 98/59, supra note 124.
144. Id.
145. Kündigungsschutzgesetz –KSchG [Protection Against Unfair Dismis-
sal Act] Ch 1, General Dismissal Protection, March 2008 [hereinafter
KSchG].
146. Id. See alsoWALTER, supra note 136, at 11.
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Council can also require a social plan of dismissal, i.e. applica-
tion of social criteria147 in determining which of the employees
should be terminated.148 This social plan is intended to protect
the most vulnerable workers, the elderly, disabled, or those
with the most dependents, by ensuring that those least likely
to be able to find a new job or those who most need the job to
meet their obligations to dependents are terminated last.149 If
the social plan is not acceptable to the employee, the employer
can increase the severance pay available, subject to agreement
by the Work Council.150 Even after an agreement with the
Work Council is reached, the employer must comply with the
statutory requirement to notify the employee.151 The minimum
requirement is four weeks’ notice, which increases depending
on the duration of the employee’s prior tenure with the compa-
ny.152 Employees who have been with the company for more
than twenty years are entitled up to seven months of notice.153
If an employer in not able to reach an agreement with the
Work Council, the process can be brought before the Concilia-
tion Board, which can take up to six months, during which the
employer must put any dismissals on hold.154 Thus, while the
actual cause of “operational requirements” is not scrutinized
147. The Work Council can look at age, length of employment with the com-
pany, number of children or other dependents, and any relevant disability.
The result is that when a particular position must be eliminated, it is not
always the incumbent of that position who is terminated. Instead, workers
could be shuffled so that a young employee with no dependents is terminated,
and an older or disabled employee with several children is shifted to that po-
sition in order to eliminate the slot he or she encumbered. Bernd Weller,
Landmark European Court of Justice Decision Validates Redundancy Social
Selection Plans and Severance Payment Formulas in Germany Except as Re-
gards Effect on Disabled Individuals., A.B.A. INT’L LAB. & EMP. L. COMMITTEE
NEWSLETTER, May 2013, available at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/newsletter/groups/labor_law/int_newslet
ter/2013/may2013/germany.html.
148. See KSchG, supra note 145.
149. WELLER, supra note 147.
150. Id.
151. LORENZ MAYR, GERMAN LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT ISSUES WITH REGARD
TO THE SET UP OF A COMPANY IN GERMANY 5 (2015), http://www.mayr-
arbeitsrecht.de/fileadmin/mayr-arbeitsrecht/Arbeitshilfen/englisch/German-
Employment-Law.pdf
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id. See alsoWALTER, supra note 136 at 11.
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for validity, the stringent requirement imposed on the employ-
er to consider possible alternatives to termination implies a va-
lidity check on its own.
IV. EU CORPORATE GOVERNANCEMODEL
The European Union has no regulation mandating a specific
model of corporate governance. The Communication from the
Commission to the European Parliament titled, Action Plan:
European Company Law and Corporate Governance (“Commu-
nication”), however, defines corporate governance as “the rela-
tionships between a company’s management, its board, its
shareholders and its other stakeholders.”155 It should be noted
that the Communication makes only limited reference to em-
ployees as stakeholders; however, it does note that corporate
governance should take employee participation into account.156
In the absence of an EU-wide requirement for minimum em-
ployee participation, Member States have adopted different
models to ensure that employees have a voice in corporate deci-
sion making.157 For example, the United Kingdom is tradition-
ally assimilated to the United States in favoring a shareholder-
value model,158 while most of continental Europe has gravitat-
ed towards a stakeholder-pluralist model.159 Interestingly, in
the stakeholder-pluralist context, the executive’s duty itself is
not much different than in the shareholder-value model.160 For
example, in Germany the duty is called Gesellschaftswohl,
which literally means “the best interests of the business.”161
The difference lies in the definition, where the interest of the
business means the interest of the enterprise as a whole, in-
cluding its employees.162 In fact, Germany represents the
strongest model of the stakeholder-pluralist system, since it
155. Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the
Council, the European economic and Social Committee and the Committee of
the Regions, at 2, COM (2012) 740 final (Dec. 12, 2012), http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52012DC0740&from=EN.
156. Id. at 3.
157. See Hopt, supra note 49, at 6–7.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. See Hodge, supra note 51, at 104–05.
161. Id.
162. Id.
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mandates an equal number of equal-membership nominations
from shareholders and from labor on the supervisory board.163
Other countries such as France and the Netherlands employ
different variations of codetermination, though they do so to a
lesser degree than Germany.164
Somewhat parallel to the governance system is the corpora-
tion’s board structure. The United States, as a country with a
shareholder-value corporate governance system, uses a one-tier
board structure, where there is no separation between man-
agement and supervision.165 However, it is common practice for
boards to delegate powers to managers below, as well as to cre-
ate subcommittees within the board to deal with specific issues,
such as compensation committees.166
In the European Union, those who elect to form a “European
Company,” rather than one incorporated at a national level,
can choose between a one- or two-tier board structure.167 Some
European countries allow for a choice at the national level as
well.168 In a two-tier structure, there is a strict division of pow-
er between the management board and the supervisory
board.169 This division allows the inclusion of stakeholders in
the governance system, by making them a part of a supervisory
board.170 Countries where employee representation is mandat-
ed require employee-side directors on the supervisory board.171
A. Employee participation in EU Corporate Governance
Directive 2002/14/EC on the Cross-Community Establish-
ment of Procedures for Information and Consultation of Em-
ployees172 provides an additional avenue on a community-scale
163. See Hopt, supra note 49, at 55.
164. Id.
165. Paul L. Davies & Klaus J. Hopt, Boards in Europe - Accountability and
Convergence 10, (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Working Paper No. 205/2013
2013).
166. Id.
167. Id. at 14.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 10.
170. Id. at 33.
171. See Hodge, supra note 51, at 116.
172. Directive 2009/38, on the Establishment of a European Works Council
or a Procedure in Community-scale Undertakings and Community-scale
Groups of Undertakings for the Purposes of Informing and Consulting Em-
ployees, 2009 O.J. (L 122) 28.
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for employee participation. This directive specifies employer
obligations for consultation with employees.173 However, in con-
trast to national level codetermination regulations that include
labor in corporate-wide decision making, this directive only al-
lows the involvement of labor in labor-related decisions.174 In
addition, employee rights are stipulated in other corporate EU
regulations. For example, the EU Takeover Directive mandates
certain requirements for disclosure to employees, and also re-
quires that the offer document stipulates the acquirer’s inten-
tions with regard to the target’s workforce.175
V: SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON ANDWHAT DOES IT
MEAN
A. Analysis of the Comparison
As demonstrated above, European employment law differs
greatly from that in the United States. For instance, while U.S.
employees enjoy only a single layer of protection – only if their
termination falls under the narrow scope of the WARN Act –
employees in Germany potentially enjoy two layers of protec-
tion, an individual level and a collective level – should their
termination fall under the much broader legal definition of a
layoff or collective dismissal. The additional requirements im-
posed on European employers in the case of layoffs, compared
to those provided by the WARN Act in the United States, have
much further reach and cover much smaller businesses, includ-
ing when there are a smaller number of terminations within
the same period of time.
The benefit under the WARN Act is sixty-days advance notice
for mass layoffs, whereas under German law workers are enti-
tled to four to twenty-eight weeks’ notice, depending on their
length of employment with the company. Workers are also enti-
tled to a social plan that ensures the most vulnerable workers
are not laid off first, as well as an appeals process during which
terminations are put on hold, and to detailed information
throughout the process about how and why a layoff is occur-
ring.176 WARN Act benefits apply only to employers with one
173. Id.
174. See Hopt, supra note 49, at 59.
175. Id. at 58.
176. See generally Directive 98/59, supra note 124; KSchG, supra note 145.
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hundred or more full-time employees when at least fifty are
being terminated at once, while the threshold is much lower in
Germany, where a termination of only five workers is subject to
protections for a layoff and employers of only twenty workers
are already subject to notice requirements.177 Moreover, the
WARN Act includes six significant exceptions,178 making the
reach of the Act extremely narrow.
Workers in the United States and in Germany are also treat-
ed differently by the respective models of corporate governance
in the two countries. The distinguishing feature between the
U.S.-shareholder model and the European-stakeholder model is
that in the latter, the well-being of employees is considered to
be part of the well-being of the company. As a consequence,
corporate decision making in the stakeholder model must take
into account the costs to workers, and workers have a voice in
the decision making process. In other words, employee protec-
tions in Europe are not limited to those guaranteed by em-
ployment laws. Parallel to these protections, in many European
countries corporate governance itself ensures employees’ par-
ticipation in the decisions that affect them. Making employees
a part of the decision-making process introduces a consultative
mechanism before major corporate decisions can be made. By
contrast, the shareholder model used in the United States does
not provide opportunities for employee participation in corpo-
rate decisions. Nor does that system provide any other alterna-
tives through which employee interests can be taken into ac-
count.179
177. KSchG, supra note 145.
178. Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act of 1988, 29
U.S.C.A. § 2101 (2000).
179. In rare cases, individual corporations may have mechanisms in place
to give employees a voice in corporate governance, but their ultimate respon-
sibility is owed to shareholders. This is confusing at best and presents a con-
flict of interest at worst. In a recent case at the Volkswagen plant in Chata-
nooga, Tennessee, German management attempted to set up a work council,
but workers voted against unionization. Lydia Depillis, Auto Union Loses
Historic Election at Volkswagen Plant in Tennessee, WASH. POST, Feb. 14,
2014, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/02/14/united-
auto-workers-lose-historic-election-at-chattanooga-volkswagen-plant/. Com-
mentators speculate that one reason the European model has not gained
steam in the United States is that workers are “spooked” by the idea of “too
much coziness with management.” Id.
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B. Is there a Conflict of Shareholder and Labor Interests?
Generally, shareholders and labor have one overlapping in-
terest, which is a prosperous company.180 The point at which
the interests of these two groups collide is when shareholders,
who aim to maximize profits in part by minimizing costs, view
labor as a cost.181 The shareholder-value system arguably has
resulted in stagnant wages in the United States,182 where the
minimum wage in real terms has been on decline since 1997.183
This conflict becomes especially apparent in the context of
mergers, acquisitions, and restructurings, given that they inev-
itably lead to asset disposals, and therefore downsizing.184 In
fact, one of the criticisms of the codetermination system which
requires labor representation is that it results in the creation of
two “camps” within the board,185 thereby hindering the general
180. Shareholders want to maximize both stock price and dividends, and
employees want both higher wages and increased job security. Presumably, a
prosperous company is more likely to provide all of these. United Auto Work-
ers President Bob King said in response to the Volkswagen case in Tennes-
see, see supra note 179:
Our philosophy is, we want to work in partnership with companies
to succeed. Nobody has more at stake in the long-term success of the
company than the workers on the shop floor . . . . We’re concerned
about competitiveness. We work together with companies to have the
highest quality, the highest productivity, the best health and safety,
the best ergonomics, and we are showing that companies that suc-
ceed by this cooperation can have higher wages and benefits because
of the joint success.
Id.
181. Simon Deakin, Corporate Governance and Financial Crisis in the Long
Run, (Cambridge University Centre for Business Research, Working Paper
No. 417, 2010).
182. Id.
183. NELP, THE “TRAINING WAGE” LOOPHOLE. A SUB-MINIMUM WAGE FOR
TEENAGERS WOULD NOT HELP MOST EMPLOYERS, WOULD PROVIDE AN UNFAIR
SUBSIDY FOR FAST FOOD AND RETAIL CHAINS, AND WOULD CREATE BAD
INCENTIVES (2012), http://nelp.3cdn.net/f10db6a2fc770a8957_76m6bed9h.pdf.
184. See Deakin, supra note 181, at 12.
185. Contradicting this view, however, is the praise frequently granted the
German system of codetermination for its role in preventing labor strikes and
in facilitating consensus between workers and management when layoffs are
economically unavoidable. See Contra William Boston, VW Labor Representa-
tives to Push for Works Council at Tennessee Plant, WALL ST. J. MARKET
WATCH, February 16, 2014, http://www.marketwatch.com/story/vw-labor-
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corporate governance function of the board.186 Furthermore,
shareholder interests run in conflict with the codetermination
system itself, where shareholders’ voting power has less
weight.187
Nonetheless, it can be argued that the clash of labor and
shareholder interests is only true if those interests are consid-
ered in the short term. Experts widely share the view that one
important factor leading to the financial crisis was so-called
“short-termism,”188 defined as the “excessive focus of corporate
managers, […] on short-term results, […] and a repudiation of
concern for long-term value creation and the fundamental val-
ue of firms.”189 There are many reasons for the rise of short-
termism, and they are not simple.190 The major push, however,
is from the desire to boost the price of shares here and now,
which is deemed to serve the interests of shareholders.191
Another related factor is the practice of earnings manage-
ment, defined as the manager’s judgment in financial reporting
and in structuring transactions to alter financial reports to ei-
ther mislead some stakeholders about the underlying economic
performance of the company or to influence contractual out-
comes that depend on reported accounting practices.192 Such a
definition usually refers to the accrual of earnings to manage-
ment, where companies engage in accounting manipulations to
decrease the amount of debt or the volume of sales, which in
turn affects share prices.193 Roychowdhury, a researcher on
both managers’ incentives and accounting and reporting choic-
es, also refers to “operational” earnings management or “real
activities manipulation,” where managers engage in sales ma-
nipulation and overproduction, while decreasing discretionary
expenditures, to be able to meet market expectations for earn-
representatives-to-push-for-works-council-at-tennessee-plant-2014-02-16-
74492237
186. See Davies, supra note 165, at 37.
187. See Hopt, supra note 49, at 56.
188. Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate
Governance, 37 J. CORP. L. 265, 267–68 (2012).
189. Id.
190. Id. See also Partnoy, supra note 10, at 154.
191. Dallas, supra note 169, at 271.
192. Healy, P.M. & J.M. Wahlen, A Review of The Earnings Management
Literature and Its Implications for Standard Setting, 13 ACCOUNTING
HORIZONS, no. 4, 1999, at 365.
193. See Dallas, supra note 188, at 278.
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ings, which again affects share prices.194 Based on comprehen-
sive company data available through Compustat,195 it appears
that manipulating real activities is in fact a commonly used
tactic in meeting earning targets.196 These short-term gains not
only hurt labor in an immediate sense,197 they also hurt the
company in the long run.198 Moreover, such a system has
broader implications for society. As discussed above, there are
clear linkages between corporate decision making and the fi-
nancial crisis. In addition, a system which inherently tries to
save on labor199 inevitably results in a society with high income
inequality.200
VI. PROPOSALS
The previous sections showed that broad employment-
protection systems, such as those that exist in Europe, coupled
with the representation of labor interests in decision making,
provide mechanisms that increase corporate accountability and
better protect workers than the current U.S. system. This sec-
tion, in addition, proposes a narrower, fault-based model that
could help change U.S. executives’ prioritization of short-term
interests and remedy a legal structure that is reluctant to regu-
late business decisions and its effect on stakeholders other
than corporate executives and shareholders. Some argue that
broad-based employee protections lead to increased unemploy-
194. Sugata Roychowdhury, Earnings Management through Real Activities
Manipulation, 42 J. ACCT’G & ECON. 335, 341 (2006).
195. Compustat is a global database of companies’ financial and market
information, which is a division of Standard and Poor’s Capital, Inc.
196. Id.
197. Id. For example, decreasing discretionary expenses–such as research
and development, administrative, and general costs–can often mean labor
cuts.
198. Id. For example, offering discounts to boost sales and generate higher
earnings in a given reporting period may actually result in decreased mar-
gins, whereas production costs relative to sales are very high.
199. See Lawrence Mishel, Declining Value of The Federal Minimum Wage
is a Major Factor Driving Inequality, in ECON. POLICY INST., THE STATE OF
WORKING AMERICA ch. 4 (12th ed. Supp. 2013),
http://s1.epi.org/files/2013/minimum-wage.pdf.
200. As of 2008, the United States has one the highest income inequality
levels within OECD countries: the top 1 percent earns 20 percent of the na-
tion’s income. ORG. ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., AN OVERVIEW OF GROWING
INCOME INEQUALITIES IN OECD COUNTRIES 38 (2011),
http://search.oecd.org/els/soc/49499779.pdf.
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ment.201 While these views lack an empirical basis, they are
very strongly held, which is why this Note also proposes a nar-
rower alternative that should be more palatable in U.S.-
corporate culture. This alternative is in line with the fault-
based common law principle of the U.S.-legal system, where
wrongdoers in nearly every noneconomic case are held liable
for the wrong committed and which the hurt party is entitled to
redress. For example, under common law, an individual owes
duty to not harm or endanger another.202 Should an individu-
al’s acts reflect something other than those of a reasonable per-
son and result in harm to another, the perpetrator is deemed
negligent and held liable to the person who has suffered
harm.203 However, U.S. law generally does not recognize purely
economic harm, and thus a harmed party can be compensated
for economic loss only if it is adjacent to a physical injury.204
One of the few exceptions is a minority rule established by New
Jersey, which states that purely economic loss is recognized if
it was especially foreseeable that the loss would occur from
negligent conduct.205
In most cases, compensation for loss of employment is ex-
cluded as a tort claim, since it is seen as a purely economic loss.
However, similar to the exception provided by the minority
rule, there are exceptions that allow for compensation in cases
201. For discussion of the criticism and an empirical analysis of twenty
three OECD countries showing otherwise, see PRABIRJIT SARKAR, Does Em-
ployment Protection Law Lead to Unemployment? A Panel Data Analysis of
OECD Countries, 1990–2008, 37 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON., no. 1 (2013). In fact, as
this Note demonstrates, Germany has strong employee protection laws and
saw a dramatic decrease in its unemployment numbers, while the United
States, which has weaker protections, has been seeing a dramatic increase in
unemployment. Steven Rattner, The Secrets of Germany’s Success What Eu-
rope’s Manufacturing Powerhouse Can Teach America, FOREIGN AFFAIRS,
Aug. 2011; A Model of Success, ECONOMIST (Nov. 9, 2013),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2012/04/germanys-mittelstand#.
202. BARRY A. LINDAHL & J. D. LEE, MODERN TORT LAW: LIABILITY AND
LITIGATION § 3:1 (2d ed. 2002).
203. Id.
204. Gennady A. Gorel, The Economic Loss Doctrine: Arguing for the Inter-
mediate Rule and Taming the Tort-Eating Monster, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 517, 520
(2006).
205. Herbert Bernstein, Civil Liability for Pure Economic Loss Under Amer-
ican Tort Law, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 111, 117–18 & 124 (1998). Similar excep-
tions now exist in other states, such as Florida, for example. See Curd v. Mo-
saic Fertilizer, LLC, 39 So. 3d 1216, 1218–19 (Fla. 2010).
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of wrongful termination for public-policy reasons.206 The public-
policy reason is usually limited to cases where the employee
was fired due to his or her failure to follow orders which them-
selves were illegal.207 In such cases courts usually order the
employee’s reinstatement.208 A less popular exception is the
“Implied Obligation of Good Faith and Fair Dealing,” under
which an employer cannot terminate someone in bad faith.209
This exception applies when an employer discharges an em-
ployee solely to avoid payment for services already per-
formed.210 Similar protections are granted by anti-retaliation
statutes for discriminatory terminations as well as for whistle
blowers.211 The underlying principle behind all these exceptions
is one of fairness and justice.212 In other words, both courts and
the legislature have refused to approve terminations that are
in violation of public policy.213
Based on the principles of a fault-based system and on the
public-policy exception pursuant to the principles of fairness
and justice, one possible remedy to the problems in the U.S.
system would be to extend the public-policy exception, so that it
would apply in cases where employees are terminated due to
the criminal or reckless behavior of an executive. In other
words, if a company cannot afford to pay its employees as a re-
sult of fraud, those who are responsible should compensate
employees who are terminated. Another similar, but not exact,
model is seen in the unemployment-insurance system, where
the amount paid by a company to the unemployment-insurance
system increases based on the number of workers the company
terminated and who then draw from the unemployment-
206. Christopher L. Pennington, The Public Policy Exception to the Em-
ployment-at-Will Doctrine: Its Inconsistencies in Application, 68 TUL. L. REV.
1583, 1593 (1994).
207. Id.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 1592 (explaining that bad faith exception applies to cases where
employers terminate workers to avoid paying bonuses or other compensa-
tion).
210. See DeMott, supra note 10, at 503.
211. Eric Duryea, Wrongful Discharge in Violation of Public Policy 1,
http://www.law.virginia.edu/pells/employment+law+4.nsf/Studentarticles/455
1DAEE81B6F1798525674F000EE0E8/$File/discharge.pdf.
212. See Pennington, supra note 206, at 1619.
213. Id.
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insurance system.214 This note proposes an additional step into
this system, one where employees would be compensated, in
addition to unemployment insurance, if they are terminated
due to the fault of the employer. Not only would such a system
serve as an additional deterrent for fraudulent activity,215 it
also would recognize an additional constituency that could
serve as a watchdog and bring cases of fraud to the attention of
the judiciary.216
A. Causality217
If such a fault-based system is adopted, undoubtedly issues of
causality will arise. Employers will contest that some external
factors, rather than a specific fraudulent or reckless decision,
are responsible for their companies’ lack of funds and the ne-
cessity to cut costs by terminating employees. The legal system
at large, and corporate law in particular, have dealt with issues
of causality, which can also be applied here. One conceivable
model is the one applied in cases of securities fraud and com-
pensation of shareholder losses. As the Supreme Court noted in
Dura Pharmaceuticals, causality can be demonstrated by show-
ing an actual loss resulting from a misleading statement.218
Cases following Dura now include event studies to show attrib-
ution of a particular part of a loss (i.e. fluctuation in market
price) to a specific fraudulent statement.219 Similarly, in the
case of claims by terminated employees, causality can be
demonstrated by showing actual loss, such as the loss of em-
ployment resulting from a lack of funds that were due to losses
in the market, resulting from fraudulent activity. Here too,
214. Timothy J. Moroney & Tyson Shower, Review of Selected 1995 Califor-
nia Legislation, 27 PAC. L.J. 893, 897 (1996).
215. Specifically, the risk of of incurring additional costs to the company of
compensating terminated employees would encourage executives to consider
the fate of workers in their business decisions and would deter them from
making risky decisions that are likely to result in layoffs.
216. Under this proposed system, former employees would have a cause of
action to challenge their termination or demand compensation when they can
prove causality between fraudulent activity and their termination.
217. For background discussion and examples of cases where corporate
fraud was temporally or causally linked to layoffs, see the Part I, infra.
218. Dura Pharm., Inc. v. Broudo, 544 U.S. 336, 338 (2005).
219. Ann Morales Olazabal, Loss Causation in Fraud-on-the-Market Cases
Post-Dura Pharmaceuticals, 3 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 337, 346–47 (2006).
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market-event studies can be employed to account for other fac-
tors that might have contributed to a lack of funds and the ne-
cessity of terminating employees.
A much more difficult claim to withstand would be when em-
ployers claim that termination was a business necessity in or-
der to maximize shareholder value. In contrast to the recom-
mendation for the adoption of broad-based legislative protec-
tions for employees, this tort-based recommendation does not
cover instances where termination is part of a business deci-
sion. Instead, this recommendation creates an additional claim
by employees, parallel to that of shareholders in cases of secu-
rities and other fraud.
CONCLUSION
As a remedy to excessive corporate risk taking that results in
a fragile economy and increasing income inequality, this Note
suggests changes in U.S. employment laws. Employee protec-
tions during layoffs and labor representation in corporate deci-
sion making leads to more responsible decisions that take into
account both short and long-term interests. The existing U.S.-
corporate legal system relies on regulating the process and is
reluctant to regulate the quality of corporate decisions. The
problem we observe, however, is that these processes have been
automatized and lack the necessary checks and balances. Em-
ployee participation and notification requirements would serve
as an additional step, which unlike other steps are harder to
skip or automatize. Consequently, such requirements can play
a critical role in slowing down decision making and preventing
excessive risk taking, steps that might have prevented the fi-
nancial crisis altogether.
Additionally, this Note proposes an alternate system of em-
ployee protection for the United States that would be fault-
based, rather than broad-based. This system would rely on tort
law, the principle of which is that the wrongdoer compensates
the harmed party. In dealing with pure economic loss doctrine,
which prevents compensation in cases where the harm is solely
economic, this Note proposes to extend the public policy excep-
tion. This alternative model is much narrower in coverage and
only deals with cases of fraud. Nevertheless, it could be a step
forward in protecting employees who have been harmed due to
intentional wrongdoing by company executives. By increasing
the costs of fraudulent activity, this model would serve as an
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additional deterrent to excessive risk taking. Furthermore, by
creating an additional watchdog body in employees, this pro-
posed system would increase the likelihood of fraud detection.
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